UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT TOM FINZEL v MAZDA MOTOR OF AMERICA, INCORPORATED No. 98-1230 A trial court necessarily has wide discretion in managing pre-trial discovery, and we review such orders for a clear abuse of discretion. See Ardrey v. United Parcel Serv., 798 F.2d 679, 682 (4th Cir. 1986). Reversal of a judgment because of an improper order denying or cur- tailing discovery is "unusual." See Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99 F.3d 505, 523 (2d Cir. 1996). Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) allows a party who has no specific material contradicting his adversary's presentation of summary judgment to survive a summary judgment motion if he presents valid reasons justi- fying his failure of proof. In the district court, Finzel filed a motion to amend the scheduling order and asserted in his response to the summary judgment motion that he had not been allowed sufficient time to conduct discovery. However, he did not, as he is required to do, file an affidavit pursuant to Rule 56(f) explaining why he could not respond to the motion for summary judgment without discovery. See Committee for First Amendment v. Campbell , 962 F.2d 1517, 1522 (10th Cir. 1992). On appeal, Finzel argues that his motion to amend and his oral argument on the summary judgment motion should satisfy the requirements of Rule 56(f). However, an "unverified assertion in a memorandum opposing summary judgment does not comply with Rule 56(f) and results in a waiver." Committee for First Amendment, 962 F.2d at 1522; see also Nguyen v. CNA Corp., 44 F.3d 234, 242 (4th Cir. 1995). "Where a party opposing summary judgment and seeking a continuance pend- ing completion of discovery fails to take advantage of the shelter pro- vided by Rule 56(f) by filing an affidavit, there is no abuse of discretion in granting summary judgment if it is otherwise appropri- ate." Pasternak v. Lear Petroleum Exploration, Inc., 790 F.2d 828, 832-33 (10th Cir. 1986). The parties do not dispute that the district court's grant of summary judgment was appropriate on the record as it existed at the time. Thus, we find that, because Finzel waived his opportunity to avoid summary judgment and secure further discovery, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying additional dis- covery. See Murphy v. International Business Machs. Corp., 23 F.3d 719, 722 (2d Cir. 1994) (concluding no abuse of discretion in ERISA 4 case where plaintiff alleged necessity for additional discovery but failed to submit affidavit specifying why). Even were we to accept Finzel's assertion that strict compliance with Rule 56(f) was unnecessary, the district court still properly denied Finzel's motion to amend the scheduling order. The party seeking additional discovery bears the burden of showing what spe- cific facts he hopes to discover that will raise an issue of material fact. See Hall v. Hawaii, 791 F.2d 759, 761 (9th Cir. 1986). The party opposing summary judgment also bears the burden of showing that the evidence sought actually exists. See VISA Int'l Serv. Ass'n v. Bankcard Holders of Am., 784 F.2d 1472, 1475 (9th Cir. 1986). "De- nial of a Rule 56(f) application is proper where it is clear that the evi- dence sought is almost certainly nonexistent or is the object of pure speculation." Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1018 (9th Cir. 1991). The nonmovant may not simply rely on vague assertions that addi- tional discovery will produce needed, but unspecified, facts. See Nguyen, 44 F.3d at 242. ---------------------------------------------