Establish grounds for summary judgment: 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994). Under Title VII, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of proving a prima facie case of discrimination by raising an inference that the defendant acted with discriminatory intent. Wileman v. Frank , 979 F.2d 30, 33 (4th Cir. 1992). This can be done either through direct evidence of discriminatory intent, or by using the four-part McDonnell Douglas scheme which provides an inference of discriminatory intent. Id. (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)). The first element of Plaintiff's prima facie case is proof that he engaged in statutorily protected activity. "Protected activity" is defined in Title VII's anti-retaliation provision, which classifies protected activity as either as opposition or participation. It is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee if (1) he or she has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII], (the opposition clause), or (2) has made a charge, testified, assisted or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII], (the participation clause). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). (EVIDENCE) a telephone conference call inquiry into the claims of EEO violations levied in writing by Patricia Thompson (hereinafter "Thompson"); a personal telephone interview by Lynn Martin (hereinafter "Martin)" (the decision maker had knowledge that the plaintiff engaged in a protected activity) with the express intent to conduct an investigation into the Thompson allegations; a telephone investigation into the Thompson allegations by William W. Allen (hereinafter "Allen") of Gess, Mattingly & Atchison, P.S.C., Legal Council for LM; a fax to Martin confirming the phone call and providing additional information; a fax to Allen confirming that call, providing proof of harassing emails and demanding an end to all harassment; emails to Martin detailing additional information regarding Thompson and informing of acts of intimidation and harassment against Plaintiff due to the retaliatory motive. See Exhibits 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 23, 22, 54, 55, 57 attached hereto and made a part hereof. MARTIN CALL Plaintiff participated in a protected activity through opposition to discrimination in a telephone interview with Lynn Martin (Martin) who called Plaintiff's home following receipt of a letter, explaining the resignation of and by Patricia Thompson, (Thompson) a minority employee who had complained about pay and hiring discrimination in her resignation letter dated February 28, 2002 (written while an employee Fed. R. Evidence P. 801 D2D), after reaching her 'last straw' with the station on December 30, 2001 (before Plaintiff was employed) (CITE): as a company investigation of the allegations made in the resignation letter which Plaintiff considered in a reasonable and good faith belief, that the opposed practice was unlawful. XXXXXXXXX Plaintiff participated in a protected activity through attempts to rectify such discrimination through repeated attempts to hire Thompson to a full time position, including making her audio demonstration presentation for official presentation in the selection process, after her resignation. (CITE) XXXXXXXXXXXX Plaintiff participated in a protected activity through repeated pleadings with the Consultant of Martin for support in hiring a minority. (CITE) Plaintiff participated in a protected activity through complaining to another outside of the company about the state of affairs in regards to Thompson's complaints. Hempfling participated in a protected activity through repeated pleadings with Charles Cohn (Cohn), General Manager of WCOO for support in hiring a minority. (CITE) ATTORNEY CALL XXXXXXXXXXXXX Hempfling participated in a protected activity through participation in an investigatory process giving testimony to legal counsel of Martin, William Allen (Allen) of Gess Mattingly & Atchison, P.S.C. of Lexington Ky. (Gess), over the phone, for which Hempfling confirmed by fax to Allen, following, when Allen called Hempfling at his home to further the investigation of Thompson's complaint after a second letter from Thompson, dated March 9, 2002. (CITE) ATTORNEY FAX XXXXXXXXXX Hempfling participated in a protected activity through confirmation of that telephone call with Allen in fax wherein Hempfling informed Allen he considered activity ongoing against him to be harassment and demanded that it be stopped by providing proof of harassing emails and demanding an end to all harassment.(CITE) MARTIN FAX XXXXXXXXXXXX Hempfling participated in a protected activity through fax dated March 21, 2002 wherein Hempfling faxed Martin a copy of the three page letter of resignation from Thompson, Martin had requested he send, in the ongoing investigation of a discrimination complaint filed with Martin by Thompson. (CITE) providing opposition to discrimination through repeated attempts to hire Thompson; attempts to train an African-American female office employee, which was prohibited by management on company time, repeated requests for African-American air talent on the radio station, for the station's participation in the African-American community and in upholding and supporting the claims made by Thompson in her allegations of EEO violations to Martin, Allen, Charles Cohn, General Manager (hereinafter "Cohn") (who had knowledge that the plaintiff engaged in a protected activity), Don Hallett, Station Consultant (hereinafter "Hallett") and others, constituting retaliatory motive. Plaintiff opposed discrimination in a reasonable manner, and the opposition was based upon a reasonable and good faith belief that there was discrimination occurring that violates one of the laws the EEOC is charged with enforcing. See Exhibits 2, 3, 4, 5, 142, 6, 9, 10, 7, 11, 12, 13, 14, 8, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 36, 16, 62, 63, 64, 75, 76, 80, 81, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90 attached hereto and made a part hereof. -------------------------------------------------- Direct evidence on file with this Court shows Plaintiff engaged in protected activities, adverse employment actions were taken against Plaintiff and there is a causal connection between the adverse actions and the protected activities. See Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec- tric Co. , 77 F.3d 745, 754 (4th Cir.), cert. denied , 117 S. Ct. 70 (1996). The Title VII burden shifting analysis set forth for discrimination claims in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-805 (1973) is applied to retaliation claims. The plaintiff first must establish the elements of the prima facie claim. In a retaliation case, plaintiff must show: (A) s/he engaged in statutorily protected conduct or expression; (B) s/he was subjected to an adverse employment action; and (C) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 365 (4th Cir. 1985). Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine , 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981). If the defendant meets this burden, then the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant's asserted reason for the employment action is a pretext for retaliation, See, e.g., Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 2000), and Plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proving that he has been the victim of retaliation. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks , 509 U.S. 502, 506-11 (1993), Carter v. Ball, 33 F.3d 450, 459 (4th Cir. 1994). Id. The plaintiff must then demonstrate that the employer's reason was mere pretext for retaliation by proving "` both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason' for the challenged conduct." Jiminez v. Mary Washington College , 57 F.3d 369, 377-78 (4th Cir.) (quoting St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks , 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993)), cert. denied , 116 S. Ct. 380 (1995). The plaintiff always has the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant engaged in retaliatory conduct. See Williams v. Cerberonics, Inc. , 871 F.2d 452, 457 (4th Cir. 1989).