Conclusions of Law Plaintiff Hempfling has Counsel may become witnesses in this action or defendants in a future action due to awareness of acts taken under the color of law. Counsel has offered no legitimate defense or rebuttal to the question of disqualification. What defense was presented, was invalid case law, itself taken out of context with no presentation of proof or any valid allegation of any wrong doing in Plaintiff's motion to disqualify. Defense Counsel has filed a motion under Rule 11. The moving attorney should be cognizant that the primary purpose of sanctions against counsel is not to compensate the prevailing party, but to "deter future litigation abuse." 32 33 34 35 36 28 Legal argument based on a knowingly false representation of law constitutes dishonesty toward the tribunal. A lawyer is not required to make a disinterested exposition of the law, but must recognize the existence of pertinent legal authorities. Furthermore, as stated in paragraph (a)(3), an advocate has a duty to disclose directly adverse authority in the controlling jurisdiction which has not been disclosed by the opposing party. The underlying concept is that legal argument is a discussion seeking to determine the legal premises properly applicable to the case. The ABA Model Rules, which serve as the basis for most state ethics rules,See STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS xxvi (2002) supra note 13, at xxvi.; prohibit lawyers from filing frivolous or unwarranted claims or defenses.MODEL RULES, supra note 13, R. 3.1.; Model Rule 3.1 sets forth the basic rule and states that “[a] lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.” Id. Lawyers have been disciplined professionally for violating state ethics rules based on Model Rule 3.1. See, e.g., In re Caranchini, 956 S.W.2d 910, 919–20 (Mo. 1997) (disbarring a lawyer for pursuing claims after it became apparent that they were not supported by the facts); In re Jackson, 682 N.E.2d 526, 529–30 (Ind. 1997) (suspending a lawyer from the practice of law for no less than three years for making false claims and pursuing a claim that had been previously litigated to finality in prior lawsuits); In re Plunkett, 432 N.W.2d 454, 455 (Minn. 1988) (issuing a public reprimand for a lawyer bringing a frivolous lawsuit). Under Rule 3.1, a comment explains that a lawyer has a “duty not to abuse legal procedure,” and that “in determining the proper scope of advocacy, account must be taken of the law’s ambiguities and potential for change” but that “both procedural and substantive” law “establish[] the limits within which an advocate may proceed.” MODEL RULES, supra note 13, R. 3.1 cmt. 1. 29 Rule 3.3 provides that, among other things, “[a] lawyer shall not knowingly . . . make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer.” Id. R. 3.3(a)(1). A comment to Rule 3.3 states that the “advocate is responsible for pleadings and other documents prepared for litigation,” and “an assertion purporting to be on the lawyer’s own knowledge, as in an affidavit by the lawyer or in a statement in open court, may properly be made only when the lawyer knows the assertion is true or believes it to be true on the basis of a reasonably diligent inquiry.” Id. R. 3.3 cmt. 3. Judge Marvin Aspen, chief judge of the Northern District of Illinois observed: "[a]ny notion that the duty to represent a client trumps obligations of professionalism is, of course, indefensible as a matter of law." 30 Judge Aspen quoted the Eleventh Circuit's admonishment in Malautea v. Suzuki Motor Co.:(31) "Federal Courts have an independent interest in ensuring that criminal trials are conducted within the ethical standards of the profession and that legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe them." Wheat, 486 U.S. at 160, 108 S.Ct. at 1697. When a district court finds that counsel has a conflict of interest, real or potential, it retains "substantial latitude" to disqualify counsel, even where a defendant consents to representation. Id. at 163, 108 S.Ct. at 1697-98. Moreover, an attorney may be dismissed for pursuing frivolous theories, even if he acts on the behest of the defendant. See United States v. Masat, 896 F.2d 88, 92 (5th Cir.1990). Violation of accepted rules of professional conduct which result in the "erosion of public confidence in the integrity of the bar and of the legal system" also may justify disqualification of defendant's chosen counsel. Hobson, 672 F.2d at 828; see, e.g., United States v. Walton, 703 F.Supp. 75, 77 (S.D.Fla.1988) (disqualification of defense attorney warranted on strength of codefendant's allegation that attorney was prepared to use false testimony). However, acts which appear to violate the ABA Code or other accepted standards of legal ethics do not confer upon the trial court unfettered discretion to disqualify the attorney selected by a party.... An attorney may be disqualified only when there is "a reasonable possibility that some specifically identifiable impropriety" actually occurred and, in light of the interest underlying the standards of ethics, the social need for ethical practice outweighs the party's right to counsel of his choice. Kitchin, 592 F.2d at 903 (quoting Woods v. Clovington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804 (5th Cir.1976)); United States v. Castellano, 610 F.Supp. 1137, 1147 (S.D.N.Y.1985). However, a defendant's right to retain counsel of his choice is not absolute and "may not 'be insisted upon in a manner that will obstruct an orderly procedure in courts of justice, and deprive such courts of the exercise of their inherent powers to control the same.' " United States v. Gipson, 693 F.2d 109, 111 (10th Cir.1982) (quoting United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 489 (D.C.Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1069, 99 S.Ct. 837, 59 L.Ed.2d 34 (1979)), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1216, 103 S.Ct. 1218, 75 L.Ed.2d 455 (1983); United States v. Freeman, 816 F.2d 558, 564 (10th Cir.1987). This is a Cause: 42:1981 Civil Rights. Based on information and belief, Plaintiff has a civil right to seek (C) protection against impairment. The rights protected by this section are protected against impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of State law Judge Andre Davis stated in Zachair, Ltd. v. Driggs, 965 F.Supp. 741, 750 (D. Md. 1997): A motion to disqualify is a 'serious matter,' Plant Genetic Systems [N.V. v. Ciba Seeds], 933 F. Supp. [514,] at 517 [(M.D.N.C. 1996)], which must be decided on a case-by case basis. See Buckley v. Airshield Corp., 908 F.Supp. 299, 304 (D.Md. 1995). This is so because two significant interests are implicated by a disqualification motion: 'the client's free choice of counsel and the maintenance of the highest ethical and professional standards in the legal community.' Tessier [v. Plastic Surgery Specialists, Inc.], 731 F. Supp. [724] at 729 [(E.D.Va. 1990)]; Buckley, 908 F.Supp. at 304. Nevertheless, 'the guiding principle in considering a motion to disqualify counsel is safeguarding the integrity of the court proceedings.' Plant Genetic Systems, 933 F.Supp. at 517; see Hull v. Celanese Corporation, 513 F.2d 568, 572 (2d Cir. 1975)(finding that a party's free choice of counsel must yield to 'considerations of ethics which run to the very integrity of our judicial process.'). Thus, this court must not weigh the competing issues 'with hairsplitting nicety but, in the proper exercise of its supervisory power over the members of the bar and with a view of preventing an appearance of impropriety, [this Court] is to resolve all doubts in favor of disqualification.' United States v. Clarkson, 567 F.2d 270, 273 n. 3 (4th Cir. 1977)(internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Rogers v. Pittston Co., 800 F.Supp. 350, 353 (W.D.Va. 1992); Buckley, 908 F.Supp. at 304. According to the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, RULE 3.7, "A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness", if the testimony relates to a contested issue. 28: 29: 30: See Marvin Aspen, Let Us Be Officers of the Court, 83 A.B.A. J. (1997), at 94. 31: 32: 33: 34: 35: 36: Under TITLE 42, CHAPTER 21, SUBCHAPTER I, Sec. 1983: A person seeking to prevent a continuation of the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws in an on-going process is obligated to raise the inference of a potential loss of such rights. This is a case of a federal question of 42 USC