LEE & SUESIE HEMPFLING. PRO SE
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Lee & Suesie ) No.
Hempfling; ) 2:15-cv-02268-DJH
Amanda Stanford, )
) CIVIL RIGHTS
Lynn Hurley, ) COMPLAINT UNDER
) 42 U.S.C. § 1983
1. This action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction as this action arises under violations of federal law 1,2,3 and personal jurisdiction as all parties hereto are domiciled in the State of Arizona, all Defendant parties acted in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction,20” not enjoying Judicial Immunity, nor Quasi-judicial immunity, and all parties are within the Jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit’s Arizona District, in Pinal County.4
2. Notice is hereby given that this action is brought against the defendants as named. Notice of Intent to file Suit, which constituted an official claim and official complaint, was issued to all parties greater than six months prior to the filing of this action5 . No party has attempted to take corrective action as required by state law, as all three docket entries regarding the illegal tax intercept placement remain on the Superior Court docket, and the Arizona Tax Intercept Program is still reporting both Plaintiffs as owing money to the Pinal County Superior Court.
3. The claims of this action arise under federal law.
4. Plaintiffs are currently under Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis with deferment of fees from the Arizona Supreme Court, for filing fees of a Special Action within that court for which there has been no declaration of the end of such deferment, nor has there been any attempt to note the amount of money for the fees to be due and payable as the case is not final6 . Plaintiffs are also under Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis with a deferment from the Pinal County Superior Court for all fees and costs and no order has issued cancelling that leave as the case is not final15.
5. This action is brought for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Constitutional rights of equal protection and due process7,8,3 under the color of law, and to the rights to protection of property through the Fifth Amendment not to have private property be taken for public use or deprived of private property without due process of law9 and the rights to be secure from unreasonable seizures afforded by the Fourth Amendment.1047
6. On April 20, 2015 notice of intent and complaint was issued to review the action of Debt Offset placement.11 The setoff procedure was not stayed pending resolution of the review or appeal as required by state law. The notice of intent constituted statements with specificity, why the Plaintiffs claim the obligation does not exist & why the obligation is incorrect12 . Except the debt was not imposed by any court. It was imposed by defendants acting as a court. No notice of intent to place the set off was ever mailed to Plaintiffs. Placement was immediate with notification in email after the fact of the first placement without reference to the second and third placements.
7. Plaintiffs are active parties to an open and unfinished Superior Court civil action that is in default status. The Bill of Rights is most applicable in its 4th, 5th and 14th Amendments to active participants in a legal proceeding; where Plaintiffs’ position is an unmistakable focus of those Amendments. The rights afforded to an active participant of an active legal case are not vague nor amorphous at all.
8. Arizona Code of Judicial Administration Part 5:13 is violated as no final judgment or order has issued in the case15 ; Pinal County Policy And Procedure 3.30 Code Of Conduct Abuse Of Position is violated in numerous sections; and the Arizona Code Of Conduct for Judicial Employees is violated in RULE 2.6. All state laws and requirements create binding obligations and none contain any enforcement mechanisms. The rights afforded to an active participant of an active legal case by these laws and rules are not vague nor amorphous either.
9. The violations addressed by this action interfere in a judicial proceeding (ARS 13-2810) by knowingly disobeying and resisting the lawful mandate of a special action by the Arizona Court of Appeals42 ; by pretending to act as judicial officers and declaring a loser in the case without a court order; and interfering with federally-protected rights through misuse of power entrusted to Defendants under state law and took place in Pinal County, Arizona within the office of the Clerk of the Superior Court, specifically April 1 and April 2, 2015 and other dates as may be discovered; and continue unabated.
10. This action contains violations of the ARIZONA CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION “Payment of deferred court fees become due upon entry of the judgment or final order… Notice of Deferred Court Fees and Costs Due on Entry of Judgment or Final Order.” 41
11. Amanda Stanford had established an official policy “to go after millions of dollars that are due and owing – by maximizing usage of Tax Intercept Programs at both the state and federal level.”40
12. Since NO final judgment, NOR final order has been entered on the docket of this case1416 , nor served to any party to the case, not signed by any Judge overseeing the case, NO payment of deferred court fees is due. Neither the deferred Superior Court fees, nor the deferred Supreme Court fees are due.1541
13. The Clerk of Court holds discretionary powers to determine whether or not, and when, or not when to invoke the process of referring a collection proceeding to a third party, such as the state of Arizona’s Tax Offset Program, a process which is an integral part of the judicial system48 when performed with jurisdiction20.
14. Clerks do not hold discretionary powers to determine if a debt is owed to the Court, that is an integral part of the judicial system reserved for a judicial officer16 and a consent decree or judgment. That rests solely with the Judge assigned to that specific case through a very specific set of legal criteria.
15. Absent the existence of a valid final order or final judgment, the clerk, whose job it is to administer the clerical duties associated with judicial proceedings, and not that of conducting or deciding them; may not determine the status of a case20, except in the instance of default.
16. There are two methods to secure a Default in Arizona Court. By Entry: Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 55(a) Application and entry:17 By Order: Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 55(b). Judgment by default: By motion.18
17. A motion was filed with the Superior Court in the case referenced herein, for Default by Motion on December 30, 2011 with the notarized affidavit for a sum certain of the amount due attached and filed. Such motion contained another notice of the commission of a crime in the beginning of the case which had been noticed to the court and all parts twice prior in filings made. No judicial response to that motion, that included all defendants and recited the facts of the case, and that has been filed, has been publicly issued by the court.
18. An order that was insufficient and VOID on its face (following a closed and private hearing in the Court in January of 2012 to which parties were not permitted to attend) was issued on February 14, 2012 that did not mention the allegations of criminal activity, but did dismiss the case with prejudice, and was not filed but was mailed as a conformed copy.
19. That order and all subsequent orders including the collection attempts, the lodging of legal fees by Defense Counsel improperly appearing (the Superior Court had never recognized counsel for the majority of defendants), the documents of May 3, 2012 and the tax offset were the subject matter of the Special Action filed with the Appeals Court49 . All orders are VOID, in part as the case is in default status due to the commission of a high crime or crimes in the beginning of the case and no valid and legal order is filed on the active case docket. If the Appeals Court followed their own special action 60 C (4) case law and that of the Arizona Supreme Court in a Special Action based in Rule 60 C(4) VOID they would have had to accept jurisdiction over the VOID orders unless those VOID orders were VOID because the case was already ADJUDICATED as a DEFAULT, wherein the Appeals Court would not have jurisdiction. The reasoning of the Appeals Court decision on the special action has not been made public.
20. On May 3, 2012 in compliance with Administrative Order 2012-04 all civil cases assigned to Judge Boyd T. Johnson (presiding over the Hempfling case) were reassigned or assigned to Judge Pro Tem Bradly M. Soos. “Effective immediately , IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that all Civil (CV) Cases assigned to the Hon. Boyd T. Johnson, including any new Civil cases prospectively assigned to said judge by Administrative Order #2012-92, are hereby reassigned or assigned to the Hon. Bradley M. Soos, Judge Pro Tempore.” That order was filed at 3:55PM.
21. On May 3, 2012 an order was filed with the clerk’s office at 4:20PM signed by Judge Boyd T. Johnson (not including all defendants with other errors), after he was no longer associated with the case by administrative order. Another order was generated on the same date for one defendant (leaving one defendant unmentioned in either document) but was issued as a conformed copy. Not all defendants were included in the total of both orders. The “filed” order had been written by defendant counsel. That order was VOID on its face.
22. The issue of VOID (A.R.S. Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(c). Mistake; inadvertence; surprise; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc.19 ) was raised in filings with Judge Soos and then in a Special Action filed with the Arizona Court of Appeals Division Two on numerous grounds and additionally filed with the Arizona Supreme Court. By the time of filing alone, the order and all subsequent document activity are not valid. By the status of a case in default the orders and all subsequent activity are not valid.
23. The order of May 3, 2012 that worked its way through the Special Action process was stamped LODGED at 5:32PM and is not and was not ever a part of the case as it was VOID the moment it was signed. Any competent Clerk viewing that document would see a filed stamp and a lodged stamp. Even without knowledge of the Administrative Order removing Judge Johnson before the document was signed and filed with the clerk, such time stamps would loudly indicate the document was not a part of the case. A document that has been ‘lodged’ with the Clerk is a document that is associated with the case but not part of the official court record.
24. According to the attachment image screen shot taken of the Clerk’s docket system by Lynn Hurley and included with the letter mentioned in this complaint, indication is given that the Clerk’s office did not assign Judge Soos to the case until May 10, 2012 (although the Administrative order was immediate) and shows the case status as ADJUDICATED although does not show when or to what end.
25. Such adjudication cannot be based on a document not active on the docket but only lodged and signed by a Judge not assigned to the case. Hurley and Stanford’s assertion that the case is ‘over’ and that there would be no further motions or orders was based on that entry of ADJUDICATED and two documents: a: the MANDATE of the Appeals Court of the Special Action dated March 10, 2014 referencing the Appeals Court’s order rendered on October 2, 2013 (which only applied to the Special Action and not the case as indicated by Jeffrey Handler Clerk of that court 21 ); and the ‘Order/Ruling’ document dated March 25th 2014 and listed on the docket as March 25, 2014 but stamped filed on March 27, 2015 simply stating “The Court of Appeals having issued its Mandate denying special action jurisdiction, IT IS ORDERED closing this case and all future hearings are vacated.”
26. The Court of Appeals issued an order on September 19, 2013 that it accepted the petition and would consider the petition for Special Action without oral argument. The order dated October 2, 2013 of the Appeals Court ordered to decline jurisdiction. Jeffrey Handler referred to that order as a decision21.
27. On April 2, 2014 then Clerk of the Superior Court Chad Roche stated, “The ORDER that shows up on the 25th would be the draft of the order filed on the 27th … Once the final order is completed and signed the draft will be deleted and replaced with the actual order … As far as I see right now, there won’t be anything else coming because the judge’s final ruling closes the case.”14 21
28. The final order that is not yet completed and signed has not been posted to the docket. The placeholder order showing up on the 25th is still there and referenced by Hurley and Stanford as proof nothing else will be filed or served. Judge Soos’ order of March 25 2014 closing the case does not preclude, nor prohibit the court from entering final orders or judgment, especially when there are none already on the docket.
29. Fees are collectable if such fees “remain unpaid after thirty calendar days following the entry of final judgment or order.” AzRCP 12-302(F). Not only are the fees not due as there is no final order or judgement, but to declare that the case is over and that therefore the only thing remaining is the collection of fees, deprives the Plaintiffs of our right to due process and equal protection as defendants are extending the authority to declare a default to the authority to declare a loser in the case itself as Arizona law requires the payment of fees by the losing party . The debt at issue has NOT been imposed by a court. Clerks are NOT judicial officers and have NO RIGHT OF LAW to determine what an ‘adjudication’ is. If an adjudication does exist that has not been noticed; has not been served and has not been made public, it can only be in Plaintiffs’ favor as the case is in default.
30. Neither Stanford, nor Hurley bothered to determine whether the docket’s notation of ‘ADJUDICATED’ was in favor of the Plaintiffs or not as such check was not necessary, and would have indicated more than a reactive decision to carry out the malicious harm they intended to inflict. Had they checked to see if the case had been won or lost by the Plaintiffs they would have found no valid order granting a win or loss to anyone, as would be the apparent standard practice for a civil case held up by a parallel criminal one.
31. They would have found both of the May 3 2012 orders as lodged and not filed. They would have
found the Decision of the Special Action would have had to be based in the Appeals’ Court lack of jurisdiction in a default.
32. Hurley and Stanford acted in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction.”20
33. The mandate of the appellate court was only for the special action, not an appeal21 or the case itself. Jeffrey P. Handler Clerk of the Court of Appeals Division Two stated: “…this court’s mandate issued March 10, 2014, and constituted the final order as far as the special action which arose from your case. I assume that since only the special action was decided, the “final order” in the case must await further proceedings in the trial court…” in Pinal County Civil case # S-1100-CV-201102200 HEMPFLING vs CVDC HOLDINGS filed 6/6/2011 ; a case IN DEFAULT DUE TO THE COMMISSION OF CRIMES IN THE CLERK’S OFFICE CONFIRMED BY THE WITNESSING OF THE OFFICIAL DOCKET BY A DEPUTY CLERK AS DETAILED IN THE CASE DOCUMENTS and noticed repeatedly to the court:22 a condition Lynn Hurley, in her previous capacity as confidant and public information officer of the Chad Roche Clerk administration, was well aware of.23
34. Regarding a previously erroneously submitted Tax Intercept process, a letter was sent to the office of the County Attorney on July 10, 2013,24 to which no reply was received, that “As the representative of the county, we demand that the office of the Pinal County Attorney intervene and stop the commission of this crime immediately.” Almost immediately the reporting of the Social Security number assigned to Lee Hempfling was removed from the Arizona Tax Intercept Program (that constituted a complaint required in law to then withdraw the tax intercept pending determination of the status of that action, which never happened). No other reporting was made to the Arizona Tax Intercept Program. Such act, including the denial of an In Forma Pauperis motion for waiver were subjects of the special action. No action has taken place in this case since the place holder notice-order25 was placed on the docket March 25, 2014.
35. Without direct knowledge as to what the delay in issuing the final order-ruling has been caused by (but assuming a parallel criminal issue as law would dictate ), Plaintiffs had made contact with the former Clerk of the Superior Court on numerous prior occasions while he was serving in that capacity14, receiving prompt, courteous and professionally ethical correspondence in return.
36. When the newly elected Clerk of Court took office we reached out to her for information.26,27,28,29 This correspondence was in printed U.S. mail. No response was forthcoming from the new clerk until 20 days later and that was in email27 in which no question was answered.
37. Plaintiffs waited until March 25th, one year to the day that the notice-order placeholder was put on the official docket to respond to her email28 . We waited until April 1, 2015 to once again follow up with Amanda Stanford29 wherein we urged a response to the March 25th query and once again provided copies of the prior official Clerk Chad Roche communications. The response we received was unethical, arrogant, intentionally malicious, and incorrect, violated rules and was criminal30.
38. The response30 originated from Lynn Hurley, who was not addressed in the inquiry, but had substantial prior knowledge and was fully aware of the case in question, and took part in the previous problem addressing the same tax intercept issue20 previously solved by the County Attorney’s Office. Hurley’s attack response is copied to Amanda Stanford, obviously at her direction and with her permission to show compliance, and to Odette Apodaca, a business manager who was copied in the original query.
39. According to the Arizona Code Of Conduct for Judicial Employees a deputy clerk is permitted to provide assistance to Litigants (C) [to] explain legal terms, [but] without providing legal interpretations by applying legal terms and concepts to specific facts31. Ms. Hurley, in blatant violation of that rule; lectured:
a. “Perhaps your difficulty lies in not understanding a few legal terms and I will take this opportunity to help you and guide you in your understanding. An “adjudicated” case means that it is finished. It is closed. There are no further actions, motions, findings or rulings on an adjudicated matter. The legal dictionary defines this term as follows:”
40. Her quoted definition states:
a. “Adjudication: The legal process of resolving a dispute. The formal giving or pronouncing of a judgment or decree in a court proceeding; also the judgment or decision given. The entry of a decree by a court in respect to the parties in a case. It implies a hearing by a court, after notice, of legal evidence on the factual issue(s) involved. The equivalent of a determination. It indicates that the claims of all the parties thereto have been considered and set at rest.
41. The quoted definition of ‘Adjudication’ is from the Free Dictionary (http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/adjudication). In fact, the case is far from closed. A clerk cannot make a legal determination of no “further actions,
motions, findings or rulings” without interfering in the judicial proceeding and aiding the defense. No claim of any party had been set at rest14. Former Clerk Chad Roche directly attested. Appeals Court Division Two Clerk Jeffrey P. Handler said so6 . Amanda Stanford, Clerk of the Superior Court knew so, by having the former clerk’s letters in her possession and Lynn Hurley knew so from her previous trusted and confidant position in the office of the Clerk of Court as well as having admitted to reading all of the documents attached to the letter she was replying to.
42. She then proceeded to treat a self-represented litigant with disdain:
a. “This means, Ms. Hempfling, that there are no further motions or orders. What is attached for your reference are the last two actions regarding this closed matter. As you can see, all that remains is the portion of your payback to the court for fees incurred.42
b. Your balance is $686.00. These fees were temporarily deferred, however your supplemental application for waiver of court fees was denied on August 27, 2013 by the Judge. […] A payment plan was set up on December 7, 2012 for $50.00 per month to commence on January 1, 2013. No payments, to date have been made on this account. Because no payment has been received, the fees owed on this case have been placed into the Tax Intercept Program (TIP). I appreciate that you have brought the matter of your outstanding fees to my attention so they can be properly collected. Please learn more about this program here:http://www.azcourts.gov/courtservices/ConsolidatedCollectionsUnit/DebtSetOffProgram.aspx”. NO internal accounting process had identified the case as owing fees.
43. The fees should also include the Arizona State Supreme Court fees, to which she does not elude and we have questioned. We also did not bring anything to her personal attention. Ms. Hurley admits:
a. “I am in receipt of your email below, and have read the entire litany of correspondence between yourself and this office. I do find the tone of your most recent email difficult to fathom, considering that your inquiries were met by this Administration with courtesy and due promptness.”
44. There had been no courtesy and no promptness and having read the ‘litany of correspondence’, which included Chad Roche definitively pronouncing the case was NOT a “closed matter” and the “portion of your payback to the court for fees incurred” is not all that remains, and is in fact not even ripe for collection and when it is a default prevailing for the Plaintiffs under Arizona law A.R.S. 12-341 the Plaintiffs will recover all costs expended or incurred from the losing parties, making the owing of any fees impossible.
45. Yet Ms. Hurley managed to, at the obvious direction and knowledge of the Amanda Stanford and the office manager, once again, yet this time not erroneously, turn the debt over to the Arizona Debt Set Off Program (tax intercept program) on April 1, 2015, placing such order on the official docket32 WITHOUT SERVING to the plaintiffs that such was placed on the docket; The allotted five days to serve passed without receipt of any documents placed on the docket dated April 1, 2015. [See DVD file LKH.]
46. Then again on April 2, 2015 she and or another person at her and Amanda Stanford’s direction placed another debt turn over to the Arizona Debt Set Off Program (tax intercept program) for another collection in the name of Suesie Hempfling, WITHOUT
SERVING to the plaintiffs that such was placed on the docket; The allotted five days to serve passed without receipt of any documents placed on the docket dated April 2, 2015. [See DVD file SKH.]
47. A deputy clerk told Lee Hempfling on the phone after receipt of Hurley’s email that the internal accounting records showed Lee Hempfling as PAID IN FULL (the clerk was indeed perplexed but it does explain why no internal accounting process identified any fees due). Yet the same office is apparently seeking to collect a total of $1372.00 from tax intercept (with both Plaintiffs reported separately for debt set off), a harm placed upon us for both the money and the potential damage to credit and the violation of our 14th Amendment guaranteed rights to due process and equal protection under the law, our rights to protection of property through the 5th Amendment, and our rights to be secure from unreasonable seizures afforded by the 4th Amendment47.
48. Stanford and Hurley are personally using their office and positions apparently attempting to maliciously collect TWICE for the same amount THAT IS NOT DUE AND IS NOT LEGALLY RIPE!
49. This blatant misuse of authority, under the color of law, is facilitated by the nearly one and a
half year delay in the release of the final order-ruling in the civil case this is in regards to; the over FOUR year period since crimes were reported to a deputy clerk and to the court in filings, to have occurred in the Clerk’s office and in blatant disregard for the law, the written instructions and essentially written testimony of the previous elected Clerk of Court and the Appeals Clerk of Court6 and any cursory review of the documents in the case on the official docket by a competent person would also indicate the same.
50. There is NO final order on the docket in this case. Just reading the headlines as if it were the Internet docket and looking up definitions of legal terms in a free online dictionary is not sufficient to overcome prior personal knowledge19 , the officially issued statements of the previous elected Clerk, rules and regulation of a court clerk, the oath of office by court clerks and the time and status stamps placed by the Clerk’s office on pertinent documents.
51. This is also defendants acting as Judges in the case, at the direction of the Amanda Stanford, making a determination of the case being finished and applying that illegal ruling in retribution and retaliation in a direct and illegal interference of a judicial proceeding in a clear absence of all jurisdiction.
52. Amanda Stanford and Lynn Hurley have struck back, maliciously retaliated against the Plaintiffs, self-represented litigants within the Pinal County court system who do not owe the court a dime until there is a final ruling issued (and then, by law such debt would be that of the Defendants’) and until the status of In Forma Pauperis is revoked for payment of deferred fees in a final order and consent decree. Neither have ever happened15 . Furthermore, this case is in default as witnessed by ‘Rebecca’ a deputy clerk in the Apache Junction satellite office of the Clerk of the Superior Court and advised repeatedly to the Superior Court beginning in August of 2011. 41
53. Through direct and reprehensible violations, under the color of state law47 and established process of Arizona Code of Judicial Administration Part 5: Court Operations Chapter 2: Programs And Standards Section 5-206: Fee Deferrals And Waivers: Section J In Compliance With Administrative Order 2011-0333 with no final judgment or order having issued in the case15 ; Pinal County Policy And Procedure 3.30 Code Of Conduct Abuse Of Position violated in numerous sections; and the Arizona Code Of Conduct for Judicial Employees violated in RULE 2.6 Amanda Stanford and Lynn Hurley acted under the color of law through violation of law, rules, and regulations to willfully deprive and cause to be deprived the rights of Plaintiffs under the Fourteenth Amendment’s rights to equal protection and due process under the law and to the rights to protection of property through the Fifth Amendment not to have private property be taken for public use or deprived of private property without due process of law and the rights to be secure from unreasonable seizures afforded by the 4th Amendment47.
54. Amanda Stanford and Lynn Hurley acted under the color of law to cause willful injury, intimidation and malicious interference42 by forceful claim to monetary property rights of Plaintiffs because of Plaintiffs’ activity as participants in an activity provided by the local Superior Court and Court Clerk’s office, namely participation in an open and ongoing action in Superior Court, following the Plaintiffs’ identifying and reporting illegal activity within the Pinal County Superior Court Clerk’s office while both Stanford and Hurley were employees thereof and for publicly supporting the re-election of the prior Clerk of Court. Previously, before the election, both Stanford and Hurley had blocked Plaintiff Lee Hempfling’s ability to read their Twitter accounts due to the support of Stanford’s political opponent.
55. 42 U.S. Code § 1983 – Civil Action for Deprivation Of Rights3: Amanda Stanford and Lynn Hurley are liable to the Plaintiffs in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. A declaratory decree was made up from whole cloth and thin air by defendants masquerading as Judges in declaring the case to be over in violation of their oath of office and the rules of the Court Clerk and state law42 A.R.S. 13-2810 by knowingly disobeying and resisting the lawful mandate of a special action by the Arizona Court of Appeals; knowingly disobeying and resisting the lawful process of the Superior Court and knowingly disobeying and resisting the lawful orders of the Superior Court. NO signed final judgment NOR signed final order has been entered on the docket and served in this case. The case is NOT FINISHED15,6. Therefore, no declaratory relief is otherwise available.
56. As attested by Appeals Court Division Two Clerk Jeffrey P. Handler6 and formerPinal County Superior Court Clerk Chad Roche15: NO entry of judgment nor final order exists issued on the docket in the case # S-1100-CV-201102200 HEMPFLING vs CVDC HOLDINGS filed 6/6/2011 Pinal County Superior Court.
57. There is a major difference between “all outstanding fees and costs must be paid within thirty days following the entry of final judgment or order” (final judgment or order means final judgment or final order, not any order especially one where a decision of the Appeals Court was mandated regarding it) and the time that “the court shall send the applicant notice of any costs or fees due.“ Basing defendants’ decision to collect (at least TWICE) on the law, it is impossible to not be in violation42 . Doing so only in reaction to a query for information from self-represented (Pro-Se) litigants who were vocal proponents of the former clerk’s reelection; as retaliation is willful intimidation with malice34 , intended to deprive not only the rights of the self-represented litigants in a civil case before the court afforded to Plaintiffs by state and federal law but is a severe hardship and financial harm with at least TWICE the debt reported for collection.
58. Since no service of process, nor proper notice was accomplished for documents placed on the docket April 1 and 2, 2015 Plaintiffs are unaware of who or what entity those documents were addressed to, what they were for other than knowledge and evidence to be entered in this case showing Arizona Tax Intercept placement as contained in audio recordings made of the state notice of collection.43
59. Pinal County Policy and Procedure 3.30 Code Of Conduct Abuse Of Position35 : Amanda Stanford and Lynn Hurley did not perform their duties with any degree of courtesy and respect and did manifest by words and conduct bias for political affiliation. Both Amanda Stanford and Lynn Hurley knew very well that Plaintiffs supported her opponent for his ethics in the last election. The defendants did not act impartially in a manner consistent with law and the public interest. Stanford and Hurley used public resources, property, and funds under their control and responsibility to turn the office of the Clerk into a debt collection agency, not for the public purpose of the office of the Clerk, intended by law, and in collection efforts under that policy against the Plaintiffs’ that are not legal.
60. Official policy was established Stanford and finally announced to the public during a Pinal County Board of Supervisor’s financial budget meeting by Lynn Hurley on April 15, 201536 just 13 days after Stanford and Hurley illegally applied that policy under the color of law43,36.
61. Establishing and executing a policy with the sole intent to “help the overall situation for our County” is not within the lawful execution of the elected office of Clerk of Court37.
62. Amanda Stanford and Lynn Hurley, without a doubt, treated Plaintiffs less favorably in part, because of their political affiliation and prior support of Stanford’s political opponent Chad Roche (who had purportedly previously discharged Hurley from her position as Public Information Officer); because of their objections to being ignored and their letter asking for a response to questions asked and the emotional reaction to that letter and the emotional disdain and anger of Stanford and Hurley at seeing letters from Chad Roche as evidence; because of their having uncovered felony corruption within the Office of the Pinal County Clerk of Court, while both Stanford and Hurley were employees of it in or about August of 2011.
63. Both Lynn Hurley and Amanda Stanford were employees of the Pinal County Clerk of Court’s office when corruption was uncovered in illegal activity in the Clerk’s office and later. The first time improper collection of undue fees was attempted Hurley handled the inquiry 23,24 and according to Stanford, “…I have been with the Clerk’s office for six years,” Stanford stated. “Every financial decision has crossed my desk…”38 Both, were well aware of the previous situation. Stanford also stated: “I know that the voters of Pinal County want to hold their elected officials to a higher standard, and I welcome the opportunity to be held to the highest standard possible…the electorate deserves no less.”
64. “We hope that your interaction with the Office of the Clerk of the Superior Court has been a pleasant one, and we hope to serve you again soon. We appreciate that you are keeping up with all of the great things that are happening here at the office via our social media! Thank you again for writing.”
65. This matter is serious. Malfeasance in office has caused Plaintiffs to be reported for debt collection we do not owe. TWICE (or more). To have caused us to have rights violated47 and prohibitions of personal reprisal violated against us in a CRIMINAL and reprehensible use of official power and authority, under the color of state law47 . Corruption of this nature cannot be tolerated in any elected office. Amanda Stanford (who touts herself as restoring ethics to the office) and Lynn Hurley, acting under the color of law have misused their official positions to inflict malicious retaliation and punishment, just for being asked for information by Pro-Se litigants in an ongoing and active judicial proceeding.
66. Plaintiffs have shown that that we have suffered, and have through tax collection actions been threatened with a concrete and particularized legal harm, and that there is a sufficient likelihood that we will again be wronged in a similar way39 as we have no other venue to seek information about our delayed and withheld civil case than the office of the Clerk of the Court, which we obviously now cannot trust, nor seek information from without further retaliation and intimidation by the defendants.
67. We are ostracized from the clerk’s office without a final order, without the ability to find out why the case is delayed and now we suffer FINANCIAL and CREDIT RATING harm and an attack on our federally protected rights; because of it and the reckless, illegal and reprehensible conduct of Amanda Stanford and Lynn Hurley. We reserve the right to add to this action, any other person, or entity subsequently discovered to have participated.
68. This complaint contains detail, more than sufficient to create a first impression reasonable expectation that discovery will surface evidence of wrongdoing44 . This complaint also shows as an issue of first impression, that the ultimate actions were not judicial and were beyond the scope of the defendants’ jurisdiction and the ultimate activities were performed without authority40.
69. All factual allegations contained herein are fully supported with direct evidence, referenced for each that prove the allegations to be plausible. No recital within this complaint of specific law violations is a mere conclusory statement. All references are factual allegations. This complaint states a highly detailed and supported plausible claim for relief45 . There are no “more likely explanations” for defendants’ conduct. Each factual allegation in this complaint details the constitutional right Plaintiffs believe was violated; the name of the Defendant(s) who violated the right; exactly what Defendants did or failed to do; how the action or inaction of that Defendant is connected to the violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional right; and what specific injury Plaintiffs suffered because of that46.
70. For this, we respectfully request this court to order:
1: Monetary consideration in the amount of a minimum of $1372.00 from each Amanda Stanford and Lynn Hurley,
2: A substantial punitive award from each Amanda Stanford and Lynn Hurley to be determined by the trier of fact,
3: Reimbursement by Defendants of all court fees incurred in bringing this case.
4: Equitable relief based on what the trier of fact deems fair and within its powers to enforce.
71. As long as Amanda Stanford and Lynn Hurley are in the positions they hold, Plaintiffs are continuing to suffer the acts perpetrated by them as detailed in this action as removal of tax intercept is required by law after complaint and could only have been ignored through a decision of the defendants. Their illegal acts disqualify both for governmental office and employment and tarnish and stain the administration of Justice in Pinal County and in the Federal District of Arizona.
72. This civil remedy is the only avenue available for justice.41
Dated: November 9, 2015
_____________________ & _____________________
Lee Hempfling Suesie Hempfling
LEE & SUESIE HEMPFLING. PRO SE
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING OR DELIVERY
On November __, 2015 a copy of this document was:
mailed First Class, postage pre-paid
Amanda Stanford, Personally %
Lynn Hurley, Personally %
1 Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 738 (1824)
2 28 U.S.C. § 1331
3 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” A court clerk is NOT a judicial officer.
4 28 U.S.C. § 1331 “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”
5 Accepted by Alice Knox, agent 4/20/2015 for Amanda Stanford, Accepted by Alice Knox, agent 4/20/2015 for Lynn Hurley.
6 See letter from Jeffrey P. Handler Clerk of the Court of Appeals Division Two
7 18 U.S.C. § 242: Civil action for deprivation of rights
8 United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941) “Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken `under color of’ state law.”
9 Reporting to the Arizona Tax Intercept Program is placing a lein on potential tax refunds. It is a seizure. It is creating a debt against the person or persons placed upon and is no different a debt than any other form of debt. It is confiscation of receipt of monies pending the action of another party. A.R.S. § 42-1122 It is also a debt reported to credit rating services the same as a garnishment, or a confiscation by government and a seriously detrimental act.
10 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
11 A.R.S. § 42-1122 H. If, within thirty days of the mailing of the notice, the taxpayer requests a review by the agency or political subdivision or provides the agency or political subdivision with proof that an appeal has been taken to the appropriate court, the agency or political subdivision shall immediately notify the department and the setoff procedure shall be stayed pending resolution of the review or appeal.
12 A.R.S. § 42-1122 J. Subsections E, G, H and I of this section do not apply to a debt imposed by a court except that the taxpayer shall receive notice of the intent to set off the debt against the refund due and the right to appeal to the court that imposed the debt within thirty days of the mailing of the notice. The basis for the request for review shall not include the validity of the claim and shall state with specificity why the taxpayer claims the obligation does not exist or why the obligation is incorrect.
13 Court Operations Chapter 2: Programs And Standards Section 5-206: Fee Deferrals And Waivers: Section J In Compliance With Administrative Order 2011-03 As provided in A.R.S. § 12-302(F), all outstanding fees and costs must be paid within thirty days following the entry of final judgment or order. On entry of judgment, decree, final order or mandate of the appellate court, the court shall send the applicant notice of any costs or fees due. The notice shall advise the applicant of the date the payment is due and instructions on how to file a supplemental application for further deferral or waiver of court fees and costs. The notice shall advise the applicant that if no application is filed the court may enter a judgment by consent.
14 Roche emails to Sun 12/28/2014 7:32 PM; email to Roche with previous follow up Sun 11/23/2014 10:58 AM; roche from Mon, 24 Nov 2014 and Wednesday, April 02, 2014; roche email Tue 11/25/2014 11:34 AM; roche email Wed 4/2/2014 2:08 PM
15 Revised Statutes §12-302 Extension of time for payment of fees and costs; relief from default for nonpayment; deferral or waiver of court fees and costs; definitions F. At the time an applicant signs and submits the application for deferral to the court, the applicant shall acknowledge under oath and sign a consent to judgment. By signing the consent to judgment, the applicant consents to judgment being entered against the applicant for all fees and costs that are deferred but that remain unpaid after thirty calendar days following the entry of final judgment or order.
16 A “judicial officer”, afforded absolute judicial immunity, is one defined as: “usually authorized to determine dispositive matters.” Clerks are not authorized to determine anything. Clerks do enjoy quasi-judicial immunity when performing a function directly related to the court’s decision-making activities or carrying out a judicial order. Walten v Denlinger 05-5170 Us District Court Eastern District Pennsylvania quoting Lockhart v. Hoenstine,411F.2d455,460 (3dCir.1969); McKnight v. Baker, 415F.Supp.2d559,563 (E.D.Pa.2006).
17 “All requests for entry of default shall be by written application to the clerk of the court in which the matter is pending.” “…the clerk shall enter that party’s default in accordance with the procedures set forth…”
18 “When the plaintiff’s claim against a defendant is for a sum certain or for a sum which can by computation be made certain, the Court upon motion of the plaintiff and upon affidavit of the amount due, and without a hearing, shall enter judgment for that amount and costs against the defendant, if the defendant has been defaulted for failure to plead or otherwise defend and is not an infant or incompetent person.”
19 “On motion and upon such terms as are just the court may relieve a party or a party’s legal representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons: … (4) the judgment is void;”
20 Clerks qualify for quasi-judicial immunity; “unless these acts were done in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-57, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 1104-05, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978); Harris, 780 F.2d at 914.
21 See letter from Jeffrey P. Handler Clerk of the Court of Appeals Division Two dated July 21, 2104:
22 As the docket indicates the Superior Court did not even recognize the counsel for the majority of the defendants as having properly appeared. Both the Appeals and Supreme Courts likewise did not recognize the counsel for the majority of defendants as properly appearing and no defendant appeared in either higher court to defend any Special Action pleadings.
23 Lynn Hurley letter Tue 7/30/2013 8:30 AM
24 Letter Pinal County Attorney Office July 10, 2013
25 roche email Wed 4/2/2014 2:08 PM
26 Amanda Stanford Letter January 20, 2015
27 Stanford email response Mon, 9 Feb 2015 17:39:38 -0700
28 Email to Amanda Stanford Wed, 25 Mar 2015 18:31:48 -0700 response with letter
30 Hurley, Lynn response letter and thread Wed, 1 Apr 2015 16:03:30 -0700 see also DVD audio files of Tax Intercept confirmations.
31 RULE 2.6 Assistance to Litigants A judicial employee shall assist litigants to access the courts by providing prompt and courteous customer service and accurate information consistent with the employee’s responsibilities and knowledge and the court’s resources and procedures while remaining neutral and impartial and avoiding the unauthorized practice of law. Employees are authorized to provide the following assistance: (C) Explain legal terms, without providing legal interpretations by applying legal terms and concepts to specific facts;
32 docket of 4/4/ 2015, copy also from 10/04/2015
33 As provided in A.R.S. § 12-302(F), all outstanding fees and costs must be paid within thirty days following the entry of final judgment or order. On entry of judgment, decree, final order or mandate of the appellate court, the court shall send the applicant notice of any costs or fees due. The notice shall advise the applicant of the date the payment is due and instructions on how to file a supplemental application for further deferral or waiver of court fees and costs. The notice shall advise the applicant that if no application is filed the court may enter a judgment by consent.
34 Billings v. Lafferty, 31 Ill. 318, 322 (1863) (clerk of court); Reed v. Conway, 20 Mo. 22, 44-52 (1854) (surveyor-general); Weeks, supra, at 210.
35 Employees should always perform their duties with courtesy and respect for the public and for co-workers and without bias or prejudice, manifest by words or conduct, based upon race, religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, disability, or political affiliation. Amanda Stanford knows very well that we supported her opponent for his ethics in the last election. See the First contact with Stanford August 2014 email thread before her swearing in. “Amanda Stanford @Stanford4Clerk to @SuesieTp no clue on the hold up. Now I’m a citizen on the outside but I believe the voters will change that soon. Write & ask for update.” “Suesie Hempfling @SuesieTp to @Stanford4Clerk been there done that.. not much help… but it will happen, I trust Chad Roche” “Amanda Stanford @Stanford4Clerk to @SuesieTp good luck with that.” “Suesie Hempfling @SuesieTp to @Stanford4Clerk i don’t need luck, i need ethics.”
Employees should perform their duties impartially in a manner consistent with law and the public interest un-swayed by kinship, position, partisan interests, public clamor, or fear of criticism or reprisal. Each employee should use the public resources, property, and funds under the employee’s control and responsibility for the public purpose intended by law and not for any private purpose. All duties shall be performed with honesty and truthfulness without falsification in any manner. ABUSE OF POSITION Employees should not: treat any individual more or less favorably because of their race, color, creed, religion, national origin, age, sex, disability, political affiliation, or the exercise of rights secured by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution;
“We come before you today to ask that – in the pursuit of golden eggs that you not kill the goose who produces them. Clerk Stanford has a solid financial background and wanted me to convey to you that the Clerk’s office has been underutilized in terms of revenue generation. We are able – with adequate staffing levels – to go after millions of dollars that are due and owing – by maximizing usage of Tax Intercept Programs at both the state and federal level, as well as increased utilization of FARE – which stands for Fines/Fees and Restitution Enforcement program. We intend to drastically improve collection efforts. These monies do not go back to the Clerk’s office but are a help to you at the General Fund Level. If we are allowed to function at levels that are productive but not wasteful, we will be able to help the overall situation for our County….and as team players that’s what we want to do! To cross the finish line in July of 2016 in better shape than this fiscal year!”
37 Arizona Revised Statutes, Title 12 – Courts and Civil Proceedings, Chapter 2 Judicial Officers And Employees, Article 8 Clerk of Superior Court, 12-284.03. Distribution of fees 9. In the county general fund, the following percentages: (b) 32.10 per cent if the county treasurer is serving in a county with a population of five hundred thousand persons or less according to the most recent United States decennial census.
39 Canatella v. California, 304 F.3d13-356722843, 852 (9th Cir. 2002)
40 Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc), overruling Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 939 (1981).
41 http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/civright/107/ “Justice Department data show that federal prosecutors declined to file charges against virtually all — 98.7% — of the individuals who the investigative agencies had concluded were in violation of 18 USC 242.”
41 Arizona Revised Statutes 12-341. Recovery of costs: The successful party to a civil action shall recover from his adversary all costs expended or incurred therein unless otherwise provided by law.
42 Arizona Revised Statutes 13-2810. Interfering with judicial proceedings: A 2. Disobeys or resists the lawful order, process or other mandate of a court; B. Interfering with judicial proceedings is a class 1 misdemeanor.
43 CD housing audio file recordings of Arizona Tax Intercept messages for both Plaintiffs and the video of Lynn Hurley’s announcement of the Clerk’s office policy regarding collections before the County Board of Supervisors.
44 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)).
45 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
46 Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976).
47 LONG V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 442 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 2006)
48 MULLIS v UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR the DISTRICT OF NEVADA; United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Decided Sept. 24, 1987.
49 Defense counsel for the majority of defendants was never recorded as having properly appeared in the Superior Court. No defense counsel appeared in the Appeals Court, nor the Supreme Court and the same missing counsel was omitted from the dockets of those higher courts.