Pinal County 60 Day Notice

February 13, 2019 1

SIXTY DAY NOTICE OF INTENT TO SUE IN ARIZONA FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT FOR VIOLATION OF TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTION 242 DEPRIVATION OF RIGHTS UNDER COLOR OF LAW; TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTION 245 FEDERALLY PROTECTED ACTIVITIES; TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTION 241 CONSPIRACY AGAINST RIGHTS UNDER 42 U.S. CODE § 1983 – CIVIL ACTION FOR DEPRIVATION OF RIGHTS: ARIZONA CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION Part 5: Court Operations Chapter 2: Programs and Standards Section 5-206: Fee Deferrals and Waivers: Section J in compliance with Administrative Order 2011-03; PINAL COUNTY POLICY AND PROCEDURE 3.30 CODE OF CONDUCT ABUSE OF POSITION;

April 15, 2015, Updated May 26, 2015

NOTICE OF INTENT TO FILE A FEDERAL LAW SUIT AGAINST:

Amanda Stanford* Clerk of the Pinal County Superior Court 971 N Jason Lopez Circle Bldg A Florence AZ 85132 Lynn Hurley* Chief Deputy to the Clerk of the Pinal County Superior Court 971 N Jason Lopez Circle Bldg A Florence AZ 85132
The Pinal County Superior Court Clerk’s Office % David Withey, Chief Counsel Legal Services Department Administrative Office of the Courts Arizona Supreme Court 1501 W. Washington Phoenix, AZ 85007 1 1  Service was initially made to the County of Pinal for the Clerk’s office. Upon receipt of notice from the Arizona Counties Insurance Pool that Pinal County was not responsible for the Office of the County’s Clerk of Court service is now made, well within 180 days of the accrual of the cause of action of this issue to the published Representative of the Legal Services Department for the Administrative Office of the Court as the receiver of process for the Pinal County Office of the Clerk of Court. 60 days for response is reset to count from May 28, 2015 and now ending on Monday, July 27, 2015.    = Previously served or copied, not requiring re-service for the purposes of this notice of intent to sue.

In addition copied to:

Lando Voyles * Pinal County Attorney 30 N. Florence St., Building D Florence, AZ 85132 Judicial Ethics Advisory *Committee, 1501 W. Washington Street, Suite 229, Phoenix, Arizona 85007 United States Attorney * District of Arizona Two Renaissance Square 40 N. Central Avenue, Suite 1200 Phoenix, AZ 85004-4408  
Pinal County Supervisors * %
Clerk of the Board
135 N. Pinal Street
Administrative Complex
Florence, AZ 8513
   

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTICED:

“Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken `under color of’ state law.” United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)

“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . .” 42 U.S.C. S 1983 (1988)

To act “under color of state law” means to act beyond the bounds of lawful authority, but in such a manner that the unlawful acts were done while the official was purporting or pretending to act in the performance of her official duties. In other words, the unlawful acts must consist of an abuse or misuse of power which is possessed by the official only because she is an official. A person may be found guilty even though she was not an official or employee of the State, or of any county, city, or other governmental unit if the essential elements of the offense charged have been established and the person was a willful participant with the state or its agents in the doing of such acts.

You are hereby given official notice of our intent to file suit against you in the Arizona District of the Ninth Circuit of the United States Court.

There are no extraordinary circumstances and the violations of law, as indicated and shown in direct evidence and allegation here as specific facts showing violations of clearly established law; show a clear absence of subject matter jurisdiction. A reasonable official should have believed that the conduct in question violated clearly established law. This notice of intent to sue is also FAIR NOTICE and fair warning that the conduct depicted here was unlawful (18 U.S.C. § 242) and that the conduct at issue has violated constitutional rights, thereby prohibiting qualified immunity.

This notice satisfies a prerequisite for the Federal Prosecutor for the district of Arizona to commence an action against Violators and is filed in compliance with time requirements2. The violations addressed by this notice took place in Pinal County within the office of the Clerk of the Superior Court, specifically April 1 and April 2, 2015 and other dates as may be discovered. The petitioners Lee & Suesie Hempfling are serving this notice by regular mail upon each person or entity responsible for the alleged violations and such entities and persons who have a legal and ethical interest in the violations.

This notice contains violations of the ARIZONA CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION “Payment of deferred court fees become due upon entry of the judgment or final order. “Notice of Deferred Court Fees and Costs Due on Entry of Judgment or Final Order.” 3

Since NO final judgment (in broad terms a final judgment is one that disposes of a cause on its merits and leaves no question open for judicial determination,) NOR final order has been entered on the docket of this case [see attachments 7,8,9,10,11] NO payment of deferred court fees is due4. The mandate of the appellate court was after a special action, not an appeal wherein declined jurisdiction proves the legally insufficient judgment placed on the docket and named in that special action was not valid enough to warrant jurisdiction in Pinal County Civil case # S-1100-CV-201102200 HEMPFLING vs CVDC HOLDINGS filed 6/6/2011 ; a case IN DEFAULT DUE TO THE COMMISSION OF CRIMES IN THE CLERK’S OFFICE CONFIRMED BY THE WITNESSING OF THE OFFICIAL DOCKET BY A DEPUTY CLERK AS DETAILED IN THE CASE DOCUMENTS. A condition Lynn Hurley, in her previous capacity as confidant and public information officer of the Chad Roche administration, was well aware of [see attachment 17].

A letter was sent to the office of the County Attorney on July 10, 2013 [see attachment 13], to which no reply was received, that “As the representative of the county, we demand that the office of the Pinal County Attorney intervene and stop the commission of this crime immediately.” Almost immediately the reporting of the Social Security number assigned to Lee Kent Hempfling was removed from the Arizona Tax Intercept Program5. No other reporting was made to the Arizona Tax Intercept Program. No action has taken place in this case since the place holder notice-order [see attachment 11] was placed on the docket March 25, 2014.

Without knowledge as to what the delay in issuing the final order-ruling has been, we have made contact with the former Clerk of the Superior Court on numerous prior occasions, receiving prompt, courteous and professionally ethical correspondence in return [see attachments 7,8,9,10,11].

When the newly elected Clerk of Court took office we reached out to her for information. [see attachment 1] This correspondence was in printed U.S. mail. No response was forthcoming from the new clerk until 20 days later and that was in email. [see attachment 5] in which no question was answered.

We waited until March 25th, one year to the day that the notice-order placeholder was put on the official docket [see attachment 11] to respond to her email [see attachment 2]. We waited until April 1, 2015 to follow up with Amanda Stanford [see attachment 4] wherein we urged a response to the March 25th query and once again provided copies of the Chad Roche communications. The response we received was unethical, arrogant, intentionally malicious, incorrect, violated rules and was criminal [see attachment 3, and see enclosed DVD audio files].

The response [see attachment 3] originated from Lynn Hurley, Chief Deputy Clerk who was not addressed in the inquiry, but had substantial prior knowledge and was fully aware of the case in question, and took part in the previous problem addressing the same tax intercept issue [see attachment 17] previously solved by the County Attorney’s Office. Hurley’s attack response is copied to Amanda Stanford, obviously at her direction to show compliance, and to Odette Apodaca, a business manager who was copied in the original query.

According to rule 2.6 of the Arizona rules of judicial conduct a deputy clerk is permitted to provide assistance to Litigants (C) [to] explain legal terms, [but] without providing legal interpretations by applying legal terms and concepts to specific facts. Ms. Hurley lectured : “Perhaps your difficulty lies in not understanding a few legal terms and I will take this opportunity to help you and guide you in your understanding. An “adjudicated” case means that it is finished. It is closed. There are no further actions, motions, findings or rulings on an adjudicated matter. The legal dictionary defines this term as follows:” in blatant violation of that rule.

Her quoted definition states:

“Adjudication

The legal process of resolving a dispute. The formal giving or pronouncing of a judgment or decree in a court proceeding; also the judgment or decision given. The entry of a decree by a court in respect to the parties in a case. It implies a hearing by a court, after notice, of legal evidence on the factual issue(s) involved. The equivalent of a determination. It indicates that the claims of all the parties thereto have been considered and set at rest.”

In fact, no claim of any party had been set at rest. Chad Roche directly said so and Lynn Hurley knew so from her previous position in the office of the Clerk of Court.

She then proceeded to treat a self-represented litigant with disdain:

“This means, Ms. Hempfling, that there are no further motions or orders. What is attached for your reference are the last two actions regarding this closed matter. As you can see, all that remains is the portion of your payback to the court for fees incurred.

Your balance is $686.00. These fees were temporarily deferred, however your supplemental application for waiver of court fees was denied on August 27, 2013 by the Judge. […] A payment plan was set up on December 7, 2012 for $50.00 per month to commence on January 1, 2013. No payments, to date have been made on this account. Because no payment has been received, the fees owed on this case have been placed into the Tax Intercept Program (TIP). I appreciate that you have brought the matter of your outstanding fees to my attention so they can be properly collected. Please learn more about this program here: http://www.azcourts.gov/courtservices/ConsolidatedCollectionsUnit/DebtSetOffProgram.aspx”

The fees also include the Arizona State Supreme Court fees, to which she does not elude and we have questioned. We also did not bring anything to her personal attention. Ms. Hurley admits:

“I am in receipt of your email below, and have read the entire litany of correspondence between yourself and this office. I do find the tone of your most recent email difficult to fathom, considering that your inquiries were met by this Administration with courtesy and due promptness.”

There had been no courtesy and no promptness and having read the ‘litany of correspondence’, which included Chad Roche definitively pronouncing the case was NOT a “closed matter” and the “portion of your payback to the court for fees incurred” is not all that remains, and is in fact not even ripe for collection. Yet Ms. Hurley managed to, at the obvious direction and knowledge of the elected Clerk of Court and the office manager, once again turn the debt over to the Arizona Debt Set Off Program (tax intercept program) on April 1, 2015, placing such order on the official docket [see attachment 12] WITHOUT SERVING to the plaintiffs that such was placed on the docket; The allotted five days to serve passed without receipt of any documents placed on the docket dated April 1, 2015. [See attached DVD file LKH.]

Then again on April 2, 2015 she and or another person at her and/or Amanda Stanford’s direction placed another debt turn over to the Arizona Debt Set Off Program (tax intercept program) for another collection in the name of Suesie Hempfling, WITHOUT SERVING to the plaintiffs that such was placed on the docket; The allotted five days to serve passed without receipt of any documents placed on the docket dated April 2, 2015. [See attached DVD file SKH.]

A deputy clerk told Lee Hempfling on the phone after receipt of Hurley’s email that the internal accounting records showed Lee Hempfling as PAID IN FULL and the debt showing under Suesie Hempfling (the fees only happen once). Yet the same office is seeking to collect a total of $1372.00 from tax intercept, a harm placed upon us for both the money and the damage to credit.

The Clerk of Court’s office is attempting to collect TWICE for the same amount THAT IS NOT DUE AND IS NOT LEGALLY RIPE!

This blatant misuse of authority, under the color of law, is a direct result of the over one year delay in the release of the final order-ruling in the civil case this is in regards to and in blatant disregard for the law, the written instructions and essential testimony of the previous elected Clerk of Court and any cursory review of the documents in the case on the official docket by a competent person would also indicated the same. There is NO final order on the docket in this case. Just reading the headlines as if it were the Internet docket is not sufficient to overcome prior personal knowledge and the word of the previous elected Clerk.

Amanda Stanford and her chief Deputy Lynn Hurley have struck back, maliciously retaliated against Suesie Hempfling, a self-represented litigant within the Pinal County court system who does not owe the court a dime until there is a final ruling. That is a violation of under the color of law and:

TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTION 242 DEPRIVATION OF RIGHTS UNDER COLOR OF LAW;

This statute makes it a crime for any person acting under color of law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom to willfully deprive or cause to be deprived from any person those rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution and laws of the U.S.

Punishment varies from a fine or imprisonment of up to one year, or both…

TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTION 245 FEDERALLY PROTECTED ACTIVITIES;

1) This statute prohibits willful injury, intimidation, or interference, or attempt to do so, by force or threat of force of any person or class of persons because of their activity as: 2) Prohibits willful injury, intimidation, or interference or attempt to do so, by force or threat of force of any person because of race, color, religion, or national origin and because of his/her activity as:b) a participant in any benefit, service, privilege, program, facility, or activity provided or administered by a state or local government;

An attack monetarily is no less threatening to the rights of a person.

TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTION 241 CONSPIRACY AGAINST RIGHTS

This statute makes it unlawful for two or more persons to conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person of any state, territory or district in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him/her by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, (or because of his/her having exercised the same).

42 U.S. CODE § 1983 – CIVIL ACTION FOR DEPRIVATION OF RIGHTS:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

NO final judgment NOR final order has been entered on the docket and served in this case [see attachments 7,8,9,10,11] therefore declaratory relief is unavailable.

ARIZONA CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION Part 5: Court Operations Chapter 2: Programs and Standards Section 5-206: Fee Deferrals and Waivers: Section J in compliance with Administrative Order 2011-03;

J. Notice of Deferred Court Fees and Costs Due on Entry of Judgment or Final Order. As provided in A.R.S. § 12-302(F), all outstanding fees and costs must be paid within thirty days following the entry of final judgment or order. On entry of judgment, decree, final order or mandate of the appellate court, the court shall send the applicant notice of any costs or fees due. The notice shall advise the applicant of the date the payment is due and instructions on how to file a supplemental application for further deferral or waiver of court fees and costs. The notice shall advise the applicant that if no application is filed the court may enter a judgment by consent.

There is a major difference between “all outstanding fees and costs must be paid within thirty days following the entry of final judgment or order” [see attachments 7,8,9,10,11] (final judgment or order means final judgment or final order, not any order) and the time that “the court shall send the applicant notice of any costs or fees due.“ Basing the Clerk’s decision to collect (TWICE) on the law, it is impossible to not be in violation. Doing so only in reaction to a query for information from a self-represented (Pro-Se) litigant as retaliation is willful intimidation, intended to deprive not only the rights of the self-represented litigants in a civil case before the court afforded to us by state and federal law but is a severe hardship and financial harm with TWICE the debt reported for collection.

PINAL COUNTY POLICY AND PROCEDURE 3.30 CODE OF CONDUCT ABUSE OF POSITION;

Employees should always perform their duties with courtesy and respect for the public and for co-workers and without bias or prejudice, manifest by words or conduct, based upon race, religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, disability, or political affiliation. Amanda Stanford knows very well that we supported her opponent for his ethics in the last election.

Employees should perform their duties impartially in a manner consistent with law and the public interest un-swayed by kinship, position, partisan interests, public clamor, or fear of criticism or reprisal.

Each employee should use the public resources, property, and funds under the employee’s control and responsibility for the public purpose intended by law and not for any private purpose.

All duties shall be performed with honesty and truthfulness without falsification in any manner.

ABUSE OF POSITION Employees should not: treat any individual more or less favorably because of their race, color, creed, religion, national origin, age, sex,

disability, political affiliation, or the exercise of rights secured by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution;

“We hope that your interaction with the Office of the Clerk of the Superior Court has been a pleasant one, and we hope to serve you again soon. We appreciate that you are keeping up with all of the great things that are happening here at the office via our social media! Thank you again for writing.” Lynn Hurley.

This matter is serious. Malfeasance in office has caused us to be reported for debt collection we do not owe. TWICE. To have caused us to have rights violated and prohibitions of personal reprisal violated against us in a CRIMINAL and reprehensible use of official power and authority, under the color of law. Corruption of this nature cannot be tolerated in any elected office. Amanda Stanford (who touts herself as restoring ethics to the office) and Lynn Hurley, acting under the color of law have misused their official positions to inflict malicious retaliation and punishment, just for asking for information by Pro-Se litigants.

For this we will demand monetary consideration in the amount of a minimum of $1372.00 from each Amanda Stanford and Lynn Hurley, plus a substantial punitive award determined by the trier of fact: and a total amount of $100,000 from the Pinal County Office of the Clerk of Superior Court.

We have no other venue to seek information about our delayed and withheld civil case than the office of the Clerk of the Court, which we obviously now cannot trust, nor seek information from without further retaliation and intimidation. We are ostracized from the clerk’s office without a final order, without the ability to find out why the case is delayed and now we suffer FINANCIAL harm and an attack on our federally protected rights; because of it and the reckless, illegal and reprehensible conduct of Amanda Stanford and Lynn Hurley and we reserve the right to add any other person, or office subsequently discovered to have participated.

Deadline of sixty days for response commences upon receipt of this notice of intent to sue.

________________________ _________________________

Lee Kent Hempfling Suesie Kent Hempfling

Apache Junction, AZ 85129

April 15, 2015

Receipt will be April 16, 2015

Notice will expire Monday June 15, 2015

REVISED:

May 26, 2015

Receipt will be May 28, 2015

Notice will expire Monday, July 27, 2015

Served via US Mail to:

Amanda Stanford * Clerk of the Pinal County Superior Court 971 N Jason Lopez Circle Bldg A Florence AZ 85132 Lynn Hurley * Chief Deputy to the Clerk of the Pinal County Superior Court 971 N Jason Lopez Circle Bldg A Florence AZ 85132 The Pinal County Superior Court Clerk’s Office % David Withey, Chief Counsel Legal Services Department Administrative Office of the Courts Arizona Supreme Court 1501 W. Washington Phoenix, AZ 85007 i

In addition copied to:

Lando Voyles * Pinal County Attorney 30 N. Florence St., Building D Florence, AZ 85132 Judicial Ethics Advisory * Committee, 1501 W. Washington Street, Suite 229, Phoenix, Arizona 85007 United States Attorney * District of Arizona Two Renaissance Square 40 N. Central Avenue, Suite 1200 Phoenix, AZ 85004-4408  
Pinal County Supervisors * %
Clerk of the Board
135 N. Pinal Street
Administrative Complex
Florence, AZ 8513
   

April 15, 2015, Updated May 26, 2015

____________________________

Lee Kent Hempfling


2  A claim must be filed within 180 days “after the cause of action accrues.” A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A). Under the statute, “a cause of action accrues when the damaged party realizes he or she has been damaged and knows or reasonably should know the cause, source, act, event, instrumentality or condition which caused or contributed to the damage.” A.R.S. § 12-821.01(B). In other words, a cause of action accrues “when the plaintiff discovers or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered that he or she has been injured by a particular defendant’s negligent conduct.” Young v. City of Scottsdale, 193 Ariz. 110, 114, 970 P.2d 942, 946 (App. 1998).

3  As provided in A.R.S. § 12-302(F), all outstanding fees and costs must be paid within thirty days following the entry of final judgment or order. On entry of judgment, decree, final order or mandate of the appellate court, the court shall send the applicant notice of any costs or fees due. The notice shall advise the applicant of the date the payment is due and instructions on how to file a supplemental application for further deferral or waiver of court fees and costs. The notice shall advise the applicant that if no application is filed the court may enter a judgment by consent.”

4  Revised Statutes §12-302 Extension of time for payment of fees and costs; relief from default for nonpayment; deferral or waiver of court fees and costs; definitions F. At the time an applicant signs and submits the application for deferral to the court, the applicant shall acknowledge under oath and sign a consent to judgment. By signing the consent to judgment, the applicant consents to judgment being entered against the applicant for all fees and costs that are deferred but that remain unpaid after thirty calendar days following the entry of final judgment or order.

5  How it was removed is address in paragraph 2 of page 7 of this document.

6  Address and phone number are NOT to be made public under any circumstances.